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Abstract
Generalizing standard monadic second-order logic for Kripke models,
we introduce monadic second-order logic MSOT interpreted over coalgebras
for an arbitrary set functor T. Similar to well-known results for monadic
second-order logic over trees, we provide a translation of this logic into
a class of automata, relative to the class of T-coalgebras that admit a
tree-like supporting Kripke frame. We then consider invariance under be-
havioral equivalence of MSOT-formulas; more in particular, we investigate
whether the coalgebraic µ-calculus is the bisimulation-invariant fragment
of MSOT. Building on recent results by the third author we show that in or-
der to provide such a coalgebraic generalization of the Janin-Walukiewicz
Theorem, it suffices to find what we call an adequate uniform construc-
tion for the functor T. As applications of this result we obtain a partly
new proof of the Janin-Walukiewicz Theorem, and bisimulation invari-
ance results for the bag functor (graded modal logic) and all exponential
polynomial functors.
Finally, we consider in some detail the monotone neighborhood functor
M, which provides coalgebraic semantics for monotone modal logic. It
turns out that there is no adequate uniform construction for M, whence
the automata-theoretic approach towards bisimulation invariance does not
apply directly. This problem can be overcome if we consider global bisim-
ulations between neighborhood models: one of our main technical results
provides a characterization of the monotone modal µ-calculus extended
with the global modalities, as the fragment of monadic second-order logic
for the monotone neighborhood functor that is invariant for global bisim-
ulations.
1
1 Introduction
1.1 Logic, automata and coalgebra
The aim of this paper is to strengthen the link between the areas of logic,
automata and coalgebra. More in particular, we provide a coalgebraic general-
ization of the automata-theoretic approach towards monadic second-order logic
(MSO), and we address the question whether the Janin-Walukiewicz Theorem
can be generalized from Kripke structures to the setting of arbitrary coalgebras.
The connection between monadic second-order logic and automata is clas-
sic, going back to the seminal work of Bu¨chi, Rabin, and others. For in-
stance, Rabin’s decidability result for the monadic second-order theory of bi-
nary trees, or S2S, makes use of a translation of monadic second-order logic
into a class of automata, thus reducing the satisfiability problem for S2S to the
non-emptiness problem for the corresponding automata [12]. The link between
MSO and automata over trees with arbitrary branching was further explored by
Walukiewicz [18]. Janin andWalukiewicz considered monadic second-order logic
interpreted over Kripke structures, and used automata-theoretic techniques to
obtain a van Benthem-like characterization theorem for monadic second-order
logic, identifying the modal µ-calculus as the bisimulation invariant fragment of
MSO [6]. Given the fact that in many applications bisimilar models are consid-
ered to represent the same process, one has little interest in properties of models
that are not bisimulation invariant. Thus the Janin-Walukiewicz Theorem can
be seen as an expressive completeness result, stating that all relevant properties
in monadic second-order logic can be expressed in the modal µ-calculus.
Coalgebra enters naturally into this picture. Recall that Universal Coalge-
bra [13] provides the notion of a coalgebra as the natural mathematical general-
ization of state-based evolving systems such as streams, (infinite) trees, Kripke
models, (probabilistic) transition systems, and many others. This approach
combines simplicity with generality and wide applicability: many features, in-
cluding input, output, nondeterminism, probability, and interaction, can easily
be encoded in the coalgebra type T (formally an endofunctor on the category
Set of sets as objects with functions as arrows). Starting with Moss’ seminal
paper [9], coalgebraic logics have been developed for the purpose of specifying
and reasoning about behavior, one of the most fundamental concepts that allows
for a natural coalgebraic formalization. And with Kripke structures constituting
key examples of coalgebras, it should come as no surprise that most coalgebraic
logics are some kind of modification or generalization of modal logic [2].
The coalgebraic modal logics that we consider here originate with Pattin-
son [11]; they are characterized by a completely standard syntax, in which the
semantics of each modality is determined by a so-called predicate lifting (see Def-
inition 2 below). Many well-known variations of modal logic in fact arise as the
coalgebraic logic MLΛ associated with a set Λ of such predicate liftings; examples
include both standard and (monotone) neighborhood modal logic, graded and
probabilistic modal logic, coalition logic, and conditional logic. Extensions of
coalgebraic modal logics with fixpoint operators, needed for describing ongoing
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behavior, were developed in [15, 1].
The link between coalgebra and automata theory is by now well-established.
For instance, finite state automata operating on finite words have been recog-
nized as key examples of coalgebra from the outset [13]. More relevant for the
purpose of this paper is the link with precisely the kind of automata mentioned
earlier, since the (potentially infinite) objects on which these devices operate,
such as streams, trees and Kripke frames, usually are coalgebras. Thus, the
automata-theoretic perspective on modal fixpoint logic could be lifted to the
abstraction level of coalgebra [15, 3]. In fact, many key results in the theory
of automata operating on infinite objects, such as Muller & Schupp’s Simula-
tion Theorem [10] can in fact be seen as instances of more general theorems in
Universal Coalgebra [7].
1.2 Coalgebraic monadic second-order logic
Missing from this picture is, to start with, a coalgebraic version of (monadic)
second-order logic. Filling this gap is the first aim of the current paper, which
introduces a notion of monadic second-order logic MSOT for coalgebras of type
T. Our formalism combines two ideas from the literature. First of all, we
looked for inspiration to the coalgebraic versions of first-order logic of Litak
& alii [8]. These authors introduced Coalgebraic Predicate Logic as a com-
mon generalisation of first-order logic and coalgebraic modal logic, combining
first-order quantification with coalgebraic syntax based on predicate liftings.
Our formalism MSOT will combine a similar syntactic feature with second-order
quantification. Second, following the tradition in automata-theoretic approaches
towards monadic second-order logic, our formalism will be one-sorted. That is,
we only allow second-order quantification in our language, relying on the fact
that individual quantification, when called for, can be encoded as second-order
quantification relativized to singleton sets. Since predicate liftings are defined as
families of maps on powerset algebras, these two ideas fit together very well, to
the effect that our second-order logic is in some sense simpler than the first-order
formalism of [8].
In section 3 we will define, for any set Λ of monotone1 predicate liftings,
a formalism MSOΛ, and we let MSOT denote the logic obtained by taking for Λ
the set of all monotone predicate liftings. Clearly we will make sure that this
definition generalizes the standard case, in the sense that the standard version
of MSO for Kripke structures instantiates the logic MSO{♦} and is equivalent to
the coalgebraic logic MSOP (where P denotes the power set functor).
The introduction of a monadic second-order logic MSOT for T-coalgebras nat-
urally raises the question, for which T the coalgebraic modal µ-calculus for T
corresponds to the bisimulation-invariant fragment of MSOT.
Question 1. Which functors T satisfy µMLT ≡ MSOT/≃?
1In the most general case, restricting to monotone predicate liftings is not needed, one could
define MSOT as the logic obtained by taking for Λ the set of all predicate liftings. However,
in the context of this paper, where we take an automata-theoretic perspective on MSO, this
restriction makes sense.
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1.3 Automata for coalgebraic monadic second-order logic
In order to address Question 1, we take an automata-theoretic perspective on
the logics MSOT and µMLT, and as the second contribution of this paper we
introduce a class of parity automata for MSOT.
As usual, the operational semantics of our automata is given in terms of a
two-player acceptance game, which proceeds in rounds moving from one basic
position to another, where a basic position is a pair consisting of a state of
the automaton and a point in the coalgebra structure under consideration. In
each round, the two players, ∃ and ∀, focus on a certain local ‘window’ on the
coalgebra structure. This ‘window’ takes the shape of a one-step T-model, that
is, a triple (X,α, V ) consisting of a set X , a chosen object α ∈ TX , and a
valuation V interpreting the states of the automaton as subsets of X . More
specifically, during each round of the game it is the task of ∃ to come up with a
valuation V that creates a one-step model in which a certain one-step formula
δ (determined by the current basic position in the game) is true.
Generally, our automata will have the shape A = (A,∆,Ω, aI) where A is
a finite carrier set with initial state aI ∈ A, and Ω and ∆ are the parity and
transition map of A, respectively. The flavour of such an automaton is largely
determined by the co-domain of its transition map ∆, the so-called one-step
language which consists of the one-step formulas that feature in the acceptance
game as described.
Each one-step language L induces its own class of automata Aut(L). For
instance, the class of automata corresponding to the coalgebraic fixpoint logic
µMLΛ can be given as Aut(MLΛ), where MLΛ is the set of positive modal formulas
of depth one that use modalities from Λ [3]. Basically then, the problem of
finding the right class of automata for the coalgebraic monadic second-order
logic MSOΛ consists in the identification of an appropriate one-step language. Our
proposal comprises a one-step second-order logic which uses predicate liftings
to describe the chosen object of the one-step model.
Finally, note that similar to the case of standard MSO, the equivalence be-
tween formulas in MSOT and automata in Aut(SO) is only guaranteed to hold for
coalgebras that are ‘tree-like’ in some sense (to be defined further on).
Theorem 1 (Automata for coalgebraic MSO). For any set Λ of monotone
predicate liftings for T there is an effective construction mapping any formula
ϕ ∈ MSOΛ into an automaton Aϕ ∈ Aut(SOΛ), which is equivalent to ϕ over
T-tree models.
The proof of Theorem 1 proceeds by induction on the complexity of MSOT-
formulas, and thus involves various closure properties of automata, such as clo-
sure under complementation, union and projection. In order to establish these
results, it will be convenient to take an abstract perspective, revealing how clo-
sure properties of a class of automata are completely determined at the level of
the one-step language.
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1.4 Bisimulation Invariance
With automata-theoretic characterizations in place for both coalgebraic MSO and
the coalgebraic µ-calculus µML, we can address Question 1 by considering the
following question:
Question 2. Which functors T satisfy Aut(ML) ≡ Aut(SO)/≃?
Continuing the program of the third author [17], we will approach this ques-
tion at the level of the one-step languages, SO and ML. To start with, observe
that any translation (from one-step formulas in) SO to (one-step formulas in)
ML naturally induces a translation from SO-automata to ML-automata. A new
observation we make here is that any so-called uniform construction on the
class of one-step models for the functor T that satisfies certain adequacy condi-
tions, provides (1) a translation (·)∗ : SO→ ML, together with (2) a construction
(·)∗ transforming a pointed T-model (S, s) into a tree model (S∗, s∗) which is a
coalgebraic pre-image of (S, s) satisfying
A accepts (S∗, s∗) iff A
∗ accepts (S, s).
From this it easily follows that an SO-automaton A is bisimulation invariant iff
it is equivalent to the ML-automaton A∗.
On the basis of these observations we can prove the following generalisation
of the Janin-Walukiewicz Theorem.
Theorem 2 (Coalgebraic Bisimulation Invariance). If the set functor T admits
an adequate uniform construction, then
µMLT ≡ MSOT/≃.
In our eyes, the significance of Theorem 2 is twofold. First of all, the proof
separates the ‘clean’, abstract part of bisimulation-invariance results from the
more functor-specific parts. As a consequence, Theorem 2 can be used to obtain
immediate results in particular cases. Examples include the power set functor
(standard Kripke structures), where the adequate uniform construction roughly
consists of taking ω-fold products (see Example 1), the bag functor (Example 2),
and all exponential polynomial functors (Corollary 3). Second, in case the
functor does not admit an adequate uniform construction, Theorem 2 may still
be of use in proving alternative characterization results for the functor.
Instantiating the latter phenomenon is the monotone neighborhood functor
M (see the next section for its definition). The importance of this functor lies,
among other things, in it providing a coalgebraic semantics for monotone modal
logic [4]. The coalgebraic monadic second-order language MSOM is equivalent
to a natural second-order language for reasoning about monotone neighbor-
hood structures that we shall denote by MMSO, and µMLM is equivalent to the
fixpoint-extension of the monotone µ-calculus, denoted µMML. As we shall see
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in Proposition 12 below,M does not admit an adequate uniform construction.2
This, however, is not the end of the story. It turns out that we can find an
adequate uniform construction for a variant M⋆ of the functor M (see Propo-
sition 14). As a corollary, we obtain a characterization of the fragment of MMSO
that is invariant under global bisimulations (bisimulations that are full on both
domain and codomain). This fragment turns out to be exactly the extension of
the monotone µ-calculus with the global modalities (for precise definitions we
refer to section 6), which we shall denote µMMLg.
In this notation, our final contribution is the following characterization re-
sult:
Theorem 3. A formula in MMSO is invariant for global neighborhood bisimula-
tions if, and only if, it is equivalent to a formula of the logic µMMLg.
2 Some technical background
In this paper we assume familiarity with the basic theory of modal (fixpoint)
logic, monadic second-order logic, coalgebra, coalgebraic modal (fixpoint) logic,
and parity games. Here we fix some notation and terminology.
2.1 Kripke models and their logics
We restrict to the theory of modal logic with one modality (and hence, one
accessibility relation). Let Var be a fixed infinite supply of variables. A Kripke
model is a structure S = (S,R, V ) where S is a set, R ⊆ S × S and V : Var →
P(S) is a Var -valuation. Associated with such a valuation V , we define the
conjugate coloring V † : S → P(Var) by V †(s) := {p ∈ Var | s ∈ V (p)}. Given
a subset T ⊆ S, the valuation V [p 7→ T ] is as V except that it maps the variable
p to T . A pointed Kripke model is a structure (S, u) where S is a Kripke model
and u is a point in S. Turning to syntax, we define the formulas of monadic
second-order logic MSO through the following grammar:
ϕ ::= sr(p) | p ⊆ q | R(p, q) | ¬ϕ | ϕ ∨ ϕ | ∃p.ϕ,
with p, q ∈ Var . Formulas are evaluated over pointed Kripke models by the
following induction:
• (S,R, V, u)  sr(p) iff V (p) = {u}
• (S,R, V, u)  p ⊆ q iff V (p) ⊆ V (q)
• (S,R, V, u)  R(p, q) iff for all v ∈ V (p) there is w ∈ V (q) with vRw
• standard clauses for the boolean connectives
2This does not necessarily mean that the monotone µ-calculus µMLM does not correspond
to the bisimulation-invariant fragment of MSOM, but it does mean that a proof of such a result,
if provable at all, will be significantly more involved than for those functors where Theorem 2
does apply.
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• (S,R, V, u)  ∃p.ϕ iff (S,R, V [p 7→ T ], u)  ϕ for some T ⊆ S.
We present the language of the modal µ-calculus µML in negation normal
form, by the following grammar:
ϕ ::= p | ¬p | ⊥ | ⊤ | ϕ ∨ ϕ | ϕ ∧ ϕ | ϕ | ♦ϕ | ηp.ϕ
where p ∈ Var , η ∈ {µ, ν}, and in the formula ηp.ϕ no free occurrence of the
variable p may be in the scope of a negation.
The satisfaction relation between pointed Kripke models and formulas in
µML is defined by the usual induction, with, e.g.
• (S,R, V, u)  µp.ϕ iff u ∈
⋂
{Z ⊆ S | ϕp(Z) ⊆ Z} where ϕp(Z) denotes
the truth set of the formula ϕ in the model (S,R, V [p 7→ Z]).
We assume familiarity with the notion of bisimilarity between two (pointed)
Kripke models, and say that a formula of MSO is bisimulation invariant if it has
the same truth value in any pair of bisimilar pointed Kripke models.
Fact 1. [6] A formula ϕ of MSO is equivalent to a formula of µML iff ϕ is
invariant for bisimulations.
2.2 Coalgebras and models
Our basic semantic structures consist of coalgebras together with valuations.
We only consider coalgebras over the base category Set with sets as objects
and functions as arrows. The co- and contravariant power set functors will be
denoted by P and Q : Set → Setop, respectively. Covariant endofunctors on
Set will be called set functors.
Definition 1. Let T be a set functor. A T-coalgebra is a pair (S, σ) consisting of
a set S, together with a map σ : S → TS. A T-model is a structure S = (S, σ, V )
where (S, σ) is a T-coalgebra and V : Var → PS. A pointed T-model is a
structure (S, s) where S is a T-model and s ∈ S.
The usual notion of a p-morphism between Kripke models can be generalized
as follows: Let S1 = (S1, σ1, V1) and S2 = (S2, σ2, V2) be two T-models and let
f : S1 → S2 be any map. Then f is said to be a T-model homomorphism if:
1. for each variable p and each u ∈ S1, we have u ∈ V1(p) iff f(u) ∈ V2(p);
2. the map f is a coalgebra morphism, i.e. we have
σ2 ◦ f = Tf ◦ σ1.
Two pointed coalgebras (S, s) and (S′, s′) are behaviorally equivalent if s and s′
can be identified by coalgebra morphisms f : S → T and f ′ : S′ → T such that
f(s) = f ′(s′).
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A coalgebraic logic consists of a set L of formulas together with, for each
coalgebra (S, σ), a truth or satisfaction relation  ⊆ S × L. A formula ϕ is
called bisimulation invariant3 if S, s  ϕ ⇐⇒ S′, s′  ϕ whenever S, s ≃ S′, s′.
Kripke frames are coalgebras for the (covariant) power set functor P . A
functor of particular interest in this paper is the monotone neighborhood functor
M, usually defined as the subfunctor of Q ◦ Q given by
MX = {N ∈ QQX | ∀Z,Z ′ : Z ∈ N & Z ⊆ Z ′ ⇒ Z ′ ∈ N}.
This functor comes equipped with the following notion of bisimilarity. A neigh-
borhood bisimulation between M-models S1 and S2 is a relation R ⊆ S1 × S2
such that, if s1Rs2 then:
• V †1 (s1) = V
†
2 (s2);
• for all Z1 in σ1(s1) there is Z2 in σ2(s2) such that, for all t2 ∈ Z2 there is
t1 ∈ Z1 with t1Rt2;
• for all Z2 in σ2(s2) there is Z1 in σ1(s1) such that, for all t1 ∈ Z1 there is
t2 ∈ Z2 with t1Rt2.
2.3 Coalgebraic µ-calculus & coalgebra automata
The modal µ-calculus is just one in a family of logical systems that may collec-
tively be referred to as the coalgebraic µ-calculus [1]. These logics essentially
make use of predicate liftings.
Definition 2. Given a set functor T, an n-place predicate lifting for T is a
natural transformation
λ : Q(−)n → Q ◦ T,
where Q(−)n denotes the n-fold product of Q with itself. A predicate lifting λ
is said to be monotone if
λX(Y1, ..., Yn) ⊆ λX(Z1, ..., Zn),
whenever Yi ⊆ Zi for each i. The Boolean dual λd of λ is defined by
(Z1, ..., Zn) 7→ TX \ (λX(X \ Z1, ..., X \ Zn)).
Given a set functor T, the language µMLT of the coalgebraic µ-calculus for
T is defined thus:
ϕ ::= p | ¬p | ⊥ | ⊤ | λ(ϕ1, ..., ϕn) | ϕ ∨ ϕ | ϕ ∧ ϕ | ηp.ϕ
3Strictly speaking, behavioral equivalence and bisimilarity are distinct concepts. However,
in many concrete cases, behavioural equivalence and bisimilarity coincide, so we shall be
content to use the more common parlance of “bisimulation invariance” rather than “invariance
for behavioural equivalence.
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where p ∈ Var , λ is any monotone n-place predicate lifting for T, η ∈ {µ, ν},
and, in ηp.ϕ, no free occurrence of the variable p is in the scope of a negation.
If we restrict the formulas λ(ϕ1, ..., ϕn) so that λ must come frome some distin-
guished set of liftings Λ, then we denote the corresponding sublanguage of µMLT
by µMLΛ.
The semantics of formulas in a pointed T-model is defined as follows:
• (S, s)  p iff s ∈ V (p) and (S, s)  ¬p iff s /∈ V (p)
• (S, s)  λ(ϕ1, ..., ϕn) iff σ(s) ∈ λS(‖ϕ1‖, ..., ‖ϕn‖), where ‖ϕi‖ = {t ∈ S |
(S, t)  ϕi} denotes the “truth set” of ϕi in S
• standard clauses for the boolean connectives
• (S, s)  µp.ϕ iff s ∈
⋂
{X ⊆ S | ϕp(X) ⊆ X}, where ϕp(Z) denotes the
truth set of the formula ϕ in the T-model (S, σ, V [p 7→ Z]).
It is routine to prove that all formulas in µMLT are bisimulation invariant.
Turning to the parity automata corresponding to the language µMLΛ, we
first define the modal one-step language ML1Λ. Its set ML
1
Λ(A) of modal one-step
formulas over a set A of variables is given by the following grammar:
ϕ ::= ⊥ | ⊤ | λ(ψ1, ..., ψn) | ϕ ∨ ϕ | ϕ ∧ ϕ
where ψ1, ..., ψn are formulas built up from variables in A using disjunctions
and conjunctions.
Definition 3. Given a functor T and a set of variables A, a one-step model
over A is a triple (X,α, V ) where X is any set, α ∈ TX and V : A → P(X) is
a valuation.
The semantics of formulas in the modal one-step language in a one-step
model is given as follows:
• standard clauses for the boolean connectives,
• (X,α, V ) 1 λ(ψ1, ..., ψn) iff α ∈ λX(‖ψ1‖, ..., ‖ψn‖), where ‖ψi‖ ⊆ X is
the (classical) truth set of the formula ψi under the valuation V .
We can now define the class of automata used to characterize the coalgebraic
µ-calculus.
Definition 4. Let P be a finite set of variables and Λ a set of predicate liftings.
Then a (P -chromatic) modal Λ-automaton is a tuple (A,∆,Ω, aI) where A is a
finite set of states with aI ∈ A,
∆ : A× P(P )→ ML1Λ(A)
is the transition map of the automaton, and Ω : A→ ω is the parity map. The
class of these automata is denoted as Aut(MLΛ).
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Position Pl’r Admissible moves
(a, s) ∈ A× S ∃ {U : A→ PS | (S, σ(s), U) 1 ∆(a, V †(s))
U : A→ PS ∀ {(b, t) | t ∈ U(b)}
The acceptance game for an automaton A = (A,∆,Ω, aI) and a T-model
(S, σ, V ) is given by the following table:
The loser of a finite match is the player who got stuck, and the winner of
an infinite match is ∃ if the greatest parity that appears infinitely often in the
match is even, and the winner is ∀ if this parity is odd. The automaton A accepts
the pointed model (S, s) if ∃ has a winning strategy in the acceptance game from
the starting position (aI , s). We say that and automaton A is equivalent to a
formula ϕ ∈ µMLΛ if, for every pointed T-model (S, s), we have that A accepts
(S, s) iff (S, s)  ϕ.
Fact 2. [3] Let T be a set functor, and Λ a set of monotone predicate liftings
for T, closed under Boolean duals. Then
µMLΛ ≡ Aut(MLΛ).
That is, there are effective transformations of formulas in µMLΛ into equivalent
automata in Aut(MLΛ), and vice versa.
3 Coalgebraic MSO
We now introduce coalgebraic monadic second-order logic for a set functor T
and a set of liftings Λ and show how MSO can be recovered as a special case.
We define the syntax of the monadic second-order logic MSOT by the following
grammar:
ϕ ::= ⊥ | sr(p) | p ⊆ q | λ(p, q1, .., qn) | ϕ ∨ ϕ | ¬ϕ | ∃p.ϕ
where λ is any n-place monotone predicate lifting and p, q, q1, ..., qn ∈ V ar.
More generally, restricting to a set Λ of monotone liftings for T, we define the
sublanguage MSOΛ ⊆ MSOT by the same grammar except that we require the
liftings to be in Λ.
For the semantics, let (S, s) be a pointed T-model. We define the satisfaction
relation  ⊆ S × MSOT as follows:
• (S, u)  sr(p) iff V (p) = {u},
• (S, u)  p ⊆ q iff V (p) ⊆ V (q),
• (S, u)  λ(p, q1, ..., qn) iff σ(v) ∈ λS(V (q1), .., V (qn)) for all v ∈ V (p),
• standard clauses for the Boolean connectives
• (S, u)  ∃p.ϕ iff (S, σ, V [p 7→ Z], u)  ϕ, some Z ⊆ S.
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We introduce the following abbreviations:
• p = q for p ⊆ q ∧ q ⊆ p,
• Em(p) for ∀q.(q ⊆ p→ q = p),
• Sing(p) for ¬Em(p) ∧ ∀q(q ⊆ p→ (em(q) ∨ q = p))
expressing, respectively, that p and q are equal, that p denotes the empty set,
and that p denotes a singleton.
Clearly, standard MSO is the logic MSO{♦}, where ♦ is the predicate lifting
corresponding to the usual diamond modality over Kripke models. Obviously
then, MSOP contains MSO. In order to see that the languages are in fact equivalent
in expressive power, we need the notion of expressive completeness, which plays
an important role in this paper.
Definition 5. A set of monotone liftings Λ for a set functor T is said to be
expressively complete if, for every finite set of variables A and every monotone
predicate lifting λ : Q(−)A → Q ◦ T, there exists a formula ϕ ∈ ML1Λ(A) such
that, for every one-step model (X,α, V ) with V : A→ Q(X), we have
(X,α, V ) 1 ϕ iff α ∈ λX(V ).
If Λ is expressively complete, then clearly µMLΛ is equivalent in expressive
power to the full language µMLT. It is not much harder to show that, under
the same conditions, MSOΛ is equivalent in expressive power to the full language
MSOT. Furthermore, expressive completeness can often be obtained fairly easily
if we make use of an application of the Yoneda lemma to represent n-place
predicate liftings as subsets of T(2n), a method developed in [14]. In particular,
since the liftings {,♦} for P are expressively complete and is clearly definable
in MSO{♦}, one can show that MSO = MSO{♦} is equivalent in expressive power to
the full coalgebraic logic MSOP . Furthermore, µMLP is equivalent to µML{,♦}.
As a second example, involving the monotone neighborhood functor M, let 
here be the predicate lifting defined by α ∈ X(Z) iff Z ∈ α, and let ♦ be
its dual. Then the language MSOM is equivalent to MSO{,♦}, and also µMLM is
equivalent to µML{,♦}.
Finally, as mentioned in the introduction, the key question in this paper will
be to compare the expressive power of coalgebraic monadic second-order logic
to that of the coalgebraic µ-calculus. The following observation, of which the
(routine) proof is omitted, provides the easy part of the link.
Proposition 1. Let Λ be a set of monotone predicate lfitings for the set functor
T. There is an inductively defined translation (·)⋄ mapping any formula ϕ ∈
µMLΛ to an equivalent formula ϕ
⋄ ∈ MSOΛ.
4 Automata for coalgebraic MSO
In this section, we introduce automata for coalgebraic monadic second-order
logic.
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4.1 A general perspective on parity automata
Standard monadic second-order formulas can be translated to equivalent au-
tomata over trees, but this equivalence is not guaranteed to extend to arbitrary
Kripke models. In the case of general coalgebra, we should expect having to
introduce a coalgebraic concept of “tree-like” models.
Definition 6. Given a set S and α ∈ TS, a subset X ⊆ S is said to be a support
for α if there is some β ∈ TX with TιX,S(β) = α. A supporting Kripke frame
for a T-coalgebra (S, σ) is a binary relation R ⊆ S × S such that, for all u ∈ S,
R(u) = {v | uRv} is a support for σ(u).
Definition 7. A T-tree model is a structure (S, R, u) where S = (S, σ, V ) is a
T-model and u ∈ S, such that R is a supporting Kripke frame for the coalgebra
(S, σ), and furthermore (S,R) is a tree rooted at u, so that there is a unique
R-path from u to w for each w ∈ S.
Our goal is to translate formulas in MSOT to equivalent automata over T-tree
models. We start by introducing a very general type of automaton, originating
with [17].
Definition 8. Given a finite set A, a generalized predicate lifting over A com-
prises an assignment of a map
ϕX : (QX)
A → QTX.
to every set X . Concepts like Boolean dual and monotonicity apply to these
liftings in the obvious way.
The difference with respect to standard predicate liftings is that the compo-
nents of a generalized predicate lifting do not need to form a natural transfor-
mation.4
Definition 9. A one-step language L consists of a collection L(A) of generalized
predicate liftings for every finite set A. The semantics of a generalized predicate
lifting ϕ in a one-step model (X,α, V ) is given by
(X,α, V ) 1 ϕ iff α ∈ ϕX(V ).
Our automata will be indexed by a (finite) set of variables involved, corre-
sponding to the set of free variables of the MSOT-formula.
Definition 10. Let P ⊆ Var be a finite set of variables and let L be a
one-step language for functor T. A (P -chromatic) L-automaton is a structure
(A,∆,Ω, aI) where
• A is a finite set, with aI ∈ A,
4In the style of abstract logic, it would make sense to require a general predicate lifting
to be natural with respect to certain maps, in particular, bijections. For the purpose of this
paper such a restriction is not needed, however.
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• Ω : A→ ω is a parity map, and
• ∆ : A× P(P )→ L(A) is the transition map of A.
The acceptance game of A with respect to a T-tree model (T,R, σ, V, u) is
given by Table 1. We say that the automaton A accepts the model (T,R, σ, V, u)
if ∃ has a winning strategy in this game (initialized at position (aI , u)).
Position Player Admissible moves Parity
(a, s) ∈ A× T ∃ {U : A→ P(R(s)) |
(R(s), σ(s), U) 1 ∆(a, V
†(s))} Ω(a)
U : A→ P(T ) ∀ {(b, t) | t ∈ U(b)} 0
Table 1: Acceptance game for parity automata.
4.2 Closure properties
This abstract level is useful for establishing some simple closure properties of
automata, based on properties of the one-step language. The first, easy, results
establish sufficient conditions for closure under union and complementation.
Proposition 2. If the one-step language L is closed under disjunction, then the
class of L-automata is closed under union.
Proposition 3. If the monotone fragment of the one-step language L is closed
under Boolean duals, then the class of L-automata is closed under complemen-
tation.
The most interesting property concerns closure under existential projection.
The following terminology is taken from [6], but instead of relying on a particular
syntactic shape of one-step formulas, we define the concepts in purely semantic
terms.
Definition 11. A predicate lifting ϕ over A is said to be special basic if, for
every one-step model (X,α, V ) such that
(X,α, V ) 1 ϕ
there is a valuation V ∗ : A→ Q(X) such that
• V ∗(a) ⊆ V (a) for each a ∈ A,
• V ∗(a) ∩ V ∗(b) = ∅ whenever a 6= b, and
• (X,α, V ∗) 1 ϕ.
Call an L-automaton non-deterministic if every lifting ∆(a, c) is special basic.
It is easy to see that if the language L is closed under disjunctions, then so
is its fragment of special basic liftings. From this we obtain the following.
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Proposition 4. If the one-step language L is closed under disjunction, then the
class of non-deterministic L-automata is closed under existential projection over
T-tree models.
Proof. Suppose A = (A,∆, aI ,Ω) is a non-deterministic L-automaton for the
variable set P . Define the P \ q-chromatic automaton ∃q.A = (A,∆∗, aI ,Ω) by
setting
∆∗(a, c) = ∆(a, c) ∨∆(a, c ∪ {q}).
It is easy to see that every T-tree model accepted by A is also accepted by ∃p.A.
Conversely, suppose ∃p.A accepts some T-tree model (S,R, σ, V, sI). For each
winning position (a, s) in the acceptance game, let V(a,s) be the valuation chosen
by ∃ according to some given winning strategy χ. Note that we can assume that
χ is a positional winning strategy, since ∃p.A is a parity automaton. It is not
difficult to see that the automaton ∃p.A is a non-deterministic automaton, and
so for each winning position (a, s) there is a valuation V ∗(a,s) : A → P(R(s)),
which is an admissible move for ∃, such that V ∗(a,s)(b) ⊆ V(a,s)(b) and such that
for all b1 6= b2 ∈ A we have V ∗(a,s)(b1) ∩ V
∗
(a,s)(b2) = ∅. Define the strategy χ
∗
by letting ∃ choose the valuation V ∗(a,s) at each winning position (a, s) - this is
still a winning strategy, since the valuations chosen by ∃ are smaller and so no
new choices for ∀ are introduced. Furthermore, χ∗ is clearly still a positional
winning strategy.
From these facts follow by a simple induction on the height of the nodes in
the supporting tree that the strategy χ∗ is scattered, i.e. that for every s ∈ S
there is at most one automaton state a such that (a, s) appears in a χ∗-guided
match of the acceptance game. So we can define a valuation V ′ like V except
we evaluate q to be true at all and only the states s such that
(R(s), σ(s), V ∗(as ,s)) 1 ∆(as, c ∪ {q}),
where as is a necessarily unique automaton state such that (a, s) appears in
some χ∗-guided match, and c is the color consisting of the variables true under
V at s. It is not hard to show that A accepts (S,R, σ, V ′, sI).
4.3 Second-order automata
We now introduce a more concrete one-step language for a given set functor T
and a given set of (natural) liftings Λ, and show that MSOΛ can be translated
into the corresponding class of automata.
Let Λ be a set of monotone predicate liftings for T. The set of second-order
one-step formulas over any set of variables A and relative to the set of liftings
Λ is defined by the grammar:
ϕ ::= a ⊆ b | λ(a1, ..., an) | ¬ϕ | ϕ ∨ ϕ | ∃a.ϕ,
where a, b, a1, ..., an ∈ A and λ is any predicate lifting in Λ. Fixing an infinite
set of “one-step variables” V ar1, and given a finite set A, the set of second-order
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one-step sentences over A, denoted SO1Λ(A), is the set of one-step formulas over
A ∪ V ar1, with all free variables belonging to A. We write SO
1
T
(A) when Λ
comprises all monotone liftings for T.
The semantics of a one-step second-order A-formula in a one-step model
(X,α, V ) (with V : A→ P(X) is defined by the following clauses:
• (X,α, V ) 1 p ⊆ q iff V (p) ⊆ V (q),
• (X,α, V ) 1 λ(p1, ..., pn) iff α ∈ λX(V (p1), ..., V (pn)),
• standard clauses for the Boolean connectives,
• (X,α, V ) 1 ∃p.ϕ iff (X,α, V [p 7→ S]) 1 ϕ for some S ⊆ X .
Any one-step second-order A-sentence ϕ can be regarded as a generalized
predicate lifting over A, with
ϕX(V ) = {α ∈ TX | (X,α, V ) 1 ϕ}.
Note that the syntax of SO1
T
allows negations, implying that not all these pred-
icate liftings are monotone.
Definition 12. Let Λ be a set of monotone predicate liftings for T. A second-
order Λ-automaton is an L-automaton for L being the assignment of the one-step
second-orderA-sentences SO1Λ(A) to every set of variables A. We write Aut(SOΛ)
to denote this class, and Aut(SOT) in case Λ is the set of all monotone predicate
liftings for T.
Our aim is to prove that every formula of MSOΛ can be translated into an
equivalent second-order Λ-automaton (over rooted T-tree models), and the main
problem here is to obtain closure under existential projection.
The key to this step is a simulation theorem. First, a useful trick due to
Walukiewicz [18] allows us to transform any second-order automaton into one
in which all the one-step formulas are monotone, when regarded as generalized
predicate liftings. We call such an automaton a monotone automaton.
Proposition 5. Let Λ be any set of monotone predicate liftings. Every automa-
ton A ∈ Aut(SOΛ) is equivalent to a monotone second-order A ∈ Aut(SOΛ).
Proof. Enumerate A as {a1, ..., ak}, and just replace each formula ∆(a, c) by
∃Z1...∃Zk.Z1 ⊆ a1 ∧ ... ∧ Zk ⊆ ak ∧∆(a, c)[Zi/ai]
where ∆(a, c)[Zi/ai] is the result of substituting the variable Zi for each open
variable ai in ∆(a, c). This new formula is monotone in the variables A and the
resulting automaton is equivalent to A.
The intuition behind the simulation theorem is the same as that behind the
standard “powerset construction” for word automata: the states of the new non-
deterministic automaton An are “macro-states” representing several possible
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states of A at once. Formally, the states of An will be binary relations over A,
and given a macro-state R, its range gives an exact description of the states in A
that are currently being visited simultaneously. It is safe to think of the macro-
states as subsets of A, however: the only reason that we have binary relations
over A as states rather than just subsets is to have a memory device so that we
can keep track of traces in infinite matches. For each macro-state R and each
colour c we want to be able to say that the one-step formulas corresponding to
each state in the range of R hold, so we want to translate the one-step formulas
over A into one-step formulas over the set of macro-states. In order to translate
a formula ∆(a, c) to a new one-step formula with macro-states as variables, we
have to replace the variable b in ∆(a, c) with a new variable that acts as a stand-
in for b. For this purpose we introduce a new, existentally quantified variable
Zb, together with a formula stating explicitly that Zb is to represent the union
of the values of all those macro states that contain b. Furthermore we want all
the one-step formulas to be special basic, and for this purpose we simply add a
conjunct “disj” to each one-step formula, stating that the values of any pair of
distinct variables appearing in the formula are to be disjoint. Finally, in order
to turn An into a parity automaton, we use a stream automaton to detect bad
traces (see for instance [16] for the details in a more specific case).
Theorem 4 (Simulation). Let Λ be a set of monotone predicate liftings for T.
For any monotone automaton A ∈ Aut(SOΛ) there exists an equivalent non-
deterministic A′ ∈ Aut(SOΛ).
Given a set A, we consider the set P(A×A) as a set of variables. Let
disj :=
∧
B 6=B′⊆A×A
∀X.(X ⊆ B ∧X ⊆ B′)→ Em(X)
Pick a fresh variable Za for each a ∈ A. Given a 1-step formula ϕ, let
ϕ[Za/a]
be the result of substituting Za for each free variable a ∈ A in ϕ. If we enumerate
the elements of A as a1, ..., ak, we now define the formula ϕ
↑b for b ∈ A to be
∃Za1 ...∃Zak .
∧
1≤i≤k(Eq(Zai
⋃
{B′ | (b, ai) ∈ B′}) ∧
ϕ[Za/a])
where Eq(Zai
⋃
{B′ | (b, ai) ∈ B
′}) is a formula asserting that the value of the
variable Zai is the union of the values of all variables B
′ with (b, ai) ∈ B′.
Let A = (A,∆, aI ,Ω) be any monadic Λ-automaton. We can assume w.l.o.g.
that A is monotone. We first construct the automaton An = (An,∆n, a∗I , F )
with a non-parity acceptance condition F ⊆ (An)ω as follows:
• An = P(A×A)
• ∆n(B, c) = disj ∧
∧
b∈π2[B]
∆(b, c)↑b
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• a∗I = {(aI , aI)}
• F is the set of streams over P(A×A) with no bad traces.
Here, π2 is the second projection of a relation B so that π2[B] denotes the
range of B. A trace in a stream (B1, B2, B3, ...) over P(A × A) is a stream
(a1, a2, a3, ...) over A with a1 ∈ π2[B1] and (aj−1, aj) ∈ Bj for j > 1. A trace is
bad if the greatest number n with Ω(ai) = n for infinitely many ai is odd.
The new automaton An is clearly special basic, because of the disj-formulas.
Lemma 1. An is equivalent to A, provided that A is monotone
Proof. Fix a pointed T-tree model (S, R, sI) where S = (S, σ, V ). We want to
show that A accepts (S, R, sI) if and only if An does. That is, we want to show
that the languages L(A) and L(An) defined by these two automata are the same.
First part: L(A) ⊆ L(An)
Suppose first that A accepts (S, R, sI). Let χ be a positional winning strategy for
∃ in the acceptance game, mapping each winning position (a, s) to a valuation
U : A→ Q(R(s)) such that
(R(s), σ(s), U) 1 ∆(a, V
†(s))
Such a strategy exists since A is a parity automaton, and so the acceptance game
is a parity game. We define the winning strategy χ∗ for ∃ in the acceptance
game for An as follows: given a position (B, s), define the function fB,s : R(s)→
P(A×A) by setting
fB,s(s
′) = {(a, b) | a ∈ π2[B] & s
′ ∈ χ(a, s)(b)}
At the position (B, s), let ∃ choose the following valuation χ∗(B, s), defined by:
χ∗(B, s)(B′) = {s′ ∈ R(s) | fB,s(s
′) = B′}
Our first claim is that, for each position of the form (B, s) where each (b, s) for
b ∈ π2[B] appears in some χ-coherent match of the acceptance game for A with
start position (aI , sI), the move for ∃ given by the strategy χ∗ is legal. To prove
this claim we need to check that, for each position (B, s), we have
(R(s), σ(s), χ∗(B, s)) 1 ∆n(B, V
†(s))
provided each (b, s) for b ∈ π2[B] appears in some χ-coherent match. First, the
formula disj is true since the marking χ∗(B, s) is the inverse of a mapping from
R(s) to P(A×A). We now have to check that, for each a′ ∈ π2[B] we have
(R(s), σ(s), χ∗(B, s)) 1 ∆(a
′, V †(s))↑a
′
We need to find sets Sa1 , ..., Sak ⊆ R(s) such that (R(s), σ(s), χ
∗(B, s)) with
the assignment Zai 7→ Sai satisfies the formula
∧
1≤i≤k Eq(Zai ,
⋃
{B′ | (a′, ai) ∈ B′}) ∧
∆(a′, V †(s))[Za/a]
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Since χ gives a legal move at the position (a′, s) for each a′ ∈ π2[B], each one-
step model of the form (R(s), σ(s), χ(a′, s)) satisfies the formula ∆(a′, V †(s)).
Hence, if we assign to each variable Zai the set χ(a
′, s)(ai), then this variable
assignment satisfies the formula
∆(a′, V †(s))[a 7→ Za | a ∈ A]
Since the formula ∆(a′, s) is monotone in all the variables A, the same is true
for any larger assignment. So it now suffices to prove that
χ(a′, s)(ai) ⊆
⋃
{χ∗(B, s)(B′) | (a′, ai) ∈ B
′}
since we can then safely take
Sai =
⋃
{χ∗(B, s)(B′) | (a′, ai) ∈ B
′}
To prove this inclusion, suppose s′ ∈ χ(a′, s)(ai). Let B′ be the relation defined
by
(d, d′) ∈ B′ ⇔ d ∈ π2[B] & s
′ ∈ χ(d, s)(d′)
Clearly, (a′, ai) ∈ B′. Moreover, fB,s(s′) = B′ by definition, and so s′ ∈
χ∗(B, s)(B′) as required.
We now show that any χ∗-coherent match with start position (a∗I , sI) is
winning for ∃. We have to prove two things: first, that ∃ never gets stuck in a
χ∗-coherent match, and second, that ∃ wins every infinite χ∗-coherent match,
i.e. no infinite χ∗-coherent match contains a bad trace.
First we show that ∃ never gets stuck. For this to be the case, all we need
to show that if (B, s) is the last position of some χ∗-coherent partial match,
then all the positions (a, s) for a ∈ π2[B] are winning positions for the strategy
χ - by our previous claim this guarantees the move χ∗(B, s) to be legal. We
prove by induction on the length of a finite partial match that this holds for
the last position of the match: it holds for ({(aI , aI)}, sI), clearly, since χ is a
winning strategy at (aI , sI). Suppose that the induction hypothesis holds for
a finite match with last position (B, s). Let (B′, s′) be any position such that
s′ ∈ χ∗(B, s)(B′). Then
B′ = fB,s(s
′) = {(a, b) | a ∈ π2[B] and s
′ ∈ χ(a, s)(b)}
So suppose b ∈ π2[B′]. Then there is some a with (a, b) ∈ B′, and we must have
a ∈ π2[B] and s′ ∈ χ(a, s)(b). But since the position (a, s) is winning by the
inductive hypothesis, this means that (b, s′) is a winning position for χ, and we
are done.
We now show that ∃ wins every infinite χ∗-coherent match. For this, it
suffices to show that every trace (a1, a2, a3, ...) in a χ
∗-coherent infinite match
(B1, s1), (B2, s2), (B3, s3), ...
corresponds to a χ-coherent match
(aI , sI) = (a1, s1), (a2, s2), (a3, s3), ...
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So fix a trace (a1, a2, s3, ...) meaning that for each ai we have (ai, ai+1) ∈ Bi+1.
We have to show that si+1 ∈ χ(ai, si)(ai+1) for each i. We have
si+1 ∈ χ∗(Bi, si)(Bi+1)
meaning that Bi+1 is equal to
fBi,si(si+1) = {(a, b) | a ∈ π2[Bi] & si+1 ∈ χ(a, si)(b)}
In particular, since (ai, ai+1) ∈ Bi+1, this means we must have si+1 ∈ χ(ai, si)(ai+1)
as required.
Second part: L(An) ⊆ L(A)
Conversely, suppose An accepts (S, sI) with winning strategy χ. We construct
a winning strategy χ∗ for ∃ w.r.t A. Note that the strategy χ is not necessarily
positional, since the acceptance game is not a parity game.
By induction on the length of a χ∗-coherent partial match
M = (a1, s1), (a2, s2), (a3, s3)...(ak, sk)
with (a1, s1) = (aI , sI), we are going to define a next legal move χ
∗(M) for ∃,
and by a simultaneous induction we construct a χ-coherent partial match
N = (B1, s1), (B2, s2), (B3, s3)...(Bk, sk)
with (B1, s1) = (a
∗
I , sI), aj ∈ π2[Bj ] for each j and (aj−1, aj) ∈ Bj for each
k ≥ j > 1. Furthermore we will make sure that whenever a χ∗-coherent match
M is an initial segment of a match M ′, the χ-coherent match associated with
M is an initial segment of the χ-coherent match associated with M ′. It will
follow at once that χ∗ is a winning strategy, since ∃ never gets stuck in any
χ∗-coherent partial match and, furthermore, every infinite χ∗-coherent match
corresponds to a trace in some χ-coherent infinite match.
The base case of the induction is the unique match of length 1 with the
single position (aI , sI), and we take the corresponding position to be (a
∗
I , sI).
Now, suppose χ∗ has been defined on all matches of length < k, and let M be
a χ∗-coherent partial match of length k of the form
(a1, s1), (a2, s2), (a3, s3)...(ak, sk)
By the inductive hypothesis we have a corresponding χ-coherent matchN which
we write as
(B1, s1), (B2, s2), (B3, s3)...(Bk, sk)
with ak ∈ π2[Bk]. Now we define the next legal move χ∗(M) for ∃, and we show
that for every position (a′, s′) such that s′ ∈ χ∗(M)(a′), we can find a relation
B′ such that (ak, a
′) ∈ B′ and
(B1, s1), (B2, s2), (B3, s3)...(Bk, sk), (B
′, s′)
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is a χ-coherent match.
Since N is a χ-coherent partial match and χ is a winning strategy for ∃, we
have that
(R(sk), σ(sk), χ(N)) 1 ∆n(Bk, V
†(sk))
Since ak ∈ π2[Bk], this means that there exist sets Sb ⊆ R(sk) for each b ∈ A
such that the 1-step model (R(sk), σ(sk), χ(N)) satisfies the formula
∧
b∈A Eq(Zb,
⋃
{B′ | (ak, b) ∈ B
′}) ∧
∆(ak, V
†(sk))[Zb/b]
under the assignment Zb 7→ Sb. Hence, the valuation U defined by
U : b 7→ Sb
will be such that
(R(sk), σ(sk), U) 1 ∆(ak, V
†(sk))
So we set χ∗(M) = U , a legal move. Note that we have
U(b) =
⋃
{χ(N)(B′) | (ak, b) ∈ B
′}
Now, let (a′, s′) be such that s′ ∈ U(a′). This means that there is some B′
with (ak, a
′) ∈ B′ and s′ ∈ χ(N)(B′). Hence, (B′, s′) satisfies the required
conditions, and we are done.
The only thing left to do at this point is to transform this automaton into
one that has its acceptance condition given by a parity map. The set of streams
over P(A×A) that contain no bad traces w.r.t. the parity map Ω is an ω-regular
stream language, so let
Z = (Z, δ, zI ,Ωz)
be a parity stream automaton, δ : Z × P(A × A) → Z, that recognizes this
language. We now construct the automaton
An ⊙ Z = (A
′
n,∆
′
n, a
′
I ,Ω
′
n)
as follows:
• A′n = An × Z
• a′I = (a
∗
I , zI)
• Ω′n(B, z) = Ω(z)
• ∆′n((B, z), c) = ∆n(B, s)[(B
′, δ(B, z))/B′]
It is not difficult to check that An ⊙ Z is equivalent to An. Since An ⊙ Z is
clearly still a non-deterministic automaton, this ends the proof of the simulation
theorem.
Combining Proposition 4 with Theorem 4, we easily obtain the following
closure property.
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Proposition 6. Let Λ be a set of monotone predicate liftings for a set functor
T. Over T-tree models, the class of second-order Λ-automata is closed under
existential projection.
We can now use the closure properties we have established for second-order
automata to give the desired translation of MSOT into second-order automata.
Proposition 7. For every formula ϕ ∈ MSOΛ with free variables in P , there
exists a P -chromatic automaton Aϕ ∈ Aut(SOΛ) which is equivalent to ϕ over
T-tree models.
Proof. Proceeding by a straightforward induction on the complexity of ϕ, we
leave it to the reader to construct appropriate automata for the atomic formulas.
The inductive cases for disjunction and negation follow by the Propositions 2
and 3, together with the easy observation that the one-step language SOΛ is
closed under disjunction and Boolean duals. The case of existential quantifica-
tion is taken care of by Proposition 6.
Theorem 1 is immediate from this, as is the following.
Corollary 1. Suppose Λ is any set of monotone predicate liftings for T such that
MSOT ≡ MSOΛ. Then for every formula of MSOT, there exists an equivalent second-
order Λ-automaton over T-tree models. In particular, this holds whenever Λ is
expressively complete.
5 Bisimulation invariance
This section continues the program of [17], making use of the automata-theoretic
translation of MSOT we have just established. The gist of our approach is that,
in order to characterize a coalgebraic fixpoint logic µML
T
as the bisimulation-
invariant fragment of MSOT, it suffices to establish a certain type of translation
between the corresponding one-step languages. First we need some definitions.
Definition 13. Given setsX,Y , a mapping h : X → Y and a valuation V : A→
Q(Y ), we define the valuation V[h] : A → Q(X) by setting V[h](b) = h
−1[V (b)]
for each b ∈ A.
The most important concept that we take from [17] is that of a uniform
translation (called uniform correspondence in [17]):
Definition 14. Given a functor T, a uniform construction F for T takes each
pair (X,α) with α ∈ TX to a tuple consisting of a set X∗, an α∗ ∈ T(X∗), and
a map hα : X∗ → X such that
T(hα)(α∗) = α
We say that the second-order one-step language SO1Λ(A) admits uniform trans-
lations if, given any natural number k, there exists a uniform construction F
and an assignment of a monotone (natural) predicate lifting
ϕ∗ : Q(−)A → Q ◦ T
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to each monotone one-step formula ϕ ∈ SO1Λ with free variables A and quantifier
depth at most k, such that for any one-step model (X,α, V ), we have
(X,α, V ) 1 ϕ
∗ iff (X∗, α∗, V[hα]) 1 ϕ.
Remark 1. It is easy to see that every monotone predicate lifting λ : Q(−)A →
Q ◦ T is equivalent to an atomic formula of ML1
T
(A). In the following we shall
not take care to distinguish between such a monotone predicate lifting and the
corresponding atomic formula.
Definition 15. Any translation (·)∗ : SO1Λ → ML
1
T
induces a construction on
automata, transforming a second-order Λ-automaton A = (A,∆, aI ,Ω) into the
modal automaton A∗ = (A,∆∗, aI ,Ω), with ∆∗ given by ∆∗(a, c) := (∆(a, c))∗.
The proof of the following result closely follows that of the main result in
[17]. The main difference with [17] is that here we need an “unravelling”-like
component.
Proposition 8. Assume that SO1Λ admits a uniform translation (·)
∗, and let A
be a second-order Λ-automaton. Then for each pointed T-model (S, s) there is a
T-tree model (T, R, t), with a T-model homomorphism f from T to S, mapping
t to s, and such that
A accepts (T, R, t) iff A∗ accepts (S, s).
Furthermore, given that S = (S, σ, V ), if the map hσ(s) : S∗ → S is surjective,
so is f .
Proof. Consider any given pointed T-model (S1, s1) where S1 = (S1, σ1, V1).
We are going to construct a T-tree model (S2, R, s2), S2 = (S2, σ2, V2), together
with a model homomorphism from the underlying pointed T-model S2 to S1
mapping s2 to s1, and such that A accepts the T-tree model (S2, s2) if and only
if A∗ accepts the pointed T-model (S1, s1).
We construct this T-tree model as follows: for each u ∈ S1, we define an
associated pair (Xu, αu) as follows: set Xu = (S1)∗ and set αu = σ1(u)∗.
Observe that, by the construction of these one-step models, for each u ∈ S1,
there is a mapping
ξu : Xu → S1
such that
1. T(ξu)(αu) = σ1(u)
2. For each valuation U : A → Q(S1), every u ∈ S1 and every one-step
formula ∆(a, c) appearing in A, we have
(S1, σ1(u), U) 1 ∆(a, c) iff (Xu, αu, U[ξu]) 1 ∆
∗(a, c)
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The map ξu is given by hσ1(u). We now construct the T-tree model (S2, R, σ2, s2, V2)
as follows: first, consider the set of all non-empty finite (non-empty) tuples
(v1, ..., vn) of elements in
{s1} ∪
⋃
u∈S1
Xu
such that v1 = s1. We define, by induction, for each natural number n > 0 a
subset Mn of this set, and a mapping γn :Mn → S1, as follows:
• set M1 = {(s1)}, and define γ1(s1) = s1.
• Set Mn+1 = {~v∗w | ~v ∈Mn, w ∈ Xγn(~v)}. Define γn+1(~v∗w) = ξγn(~v)(w).
Here, we write ~v ∗ w to denote the tuple (v1, ..., vn, w) if ~v = (v1, ..., vn). Set
S2 =
⋃
n>0Mn, and define γ =
⋃
n>0 γn. Define the relation R ⊆ S2 × S2 to be
{(~v,~v ∗ w) | ~v ∈ S2, w ∈ Xγ(~v)}
Note that there is, for every ~v ∈ S2, a bijection i~v : Xγ(~v) ≃ R[~v] given by
w 7→ ~v ∗ w. Note also that, for each ~v ∈ S2, we have
γ ◦ i~v = ξγ(~v)
With this in mind, we define the coalgebra structure σ2 by setting
σ2(~v) = T (i~v)(αγ(~v))
Finally, set s2 to be the unique singleton tuple with sole element s1, and define
the valuation V2 by setting V
†
2 (~v) = V
†
1 (γ(~v)).
Clearly, (S2, R, σ2, s2, V2) is a T-tree model. Denote the underlying T -model
by S2. We can then prove the following two claims:
Claim 1: The map γ is a T -model homomorphism from S2 to S1.
Claim 2: A accepts (S2, R, σ2, s2, V2) iff A∗ accepts S1.
The proof of Claim 2 is left to the reader. We prove the first claim:
The map γ clearly respects the truth values of all propositional atoms, and
γ(s2) = s1. It suffices to show that γ is a coalgebra morphism, i.e. that
Tγ(σ2(~v)) = σ1(γ(~v)) for all ~v. Pick any ~v ∈ S2. We have:
Tγ(σ2(~v)) = Tγ ◦ T(i~v)(αγ(~v)) (1)
= T(γ ◦ i~v)(αγ(~v)) (2)
= T(ξγ(~v))(αγ(~v)) (3)
= σ1(γ(~v)) (4)
as required.
From this, a routine argument yields the following result.
Theorem 5 (Characterization Theorem 1). Let Λ be an expressively complete
set of monotone predicate liftings for a set functor T, and assume that SOΛ(A)
(for any set of variables A) admits uniform translations. Then µMLΛ is the
bisimulation-invariant fragment of MSOΛ.
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The existence of uniform translations for the one-step language [17] involves
two components: a translation on the syntactic side and a uniform construction
on the semantic side. However, as we shall now see, we can focus entirely on
finding a suitable uniform construction for the one-step models; the syntactic
translation will come for free.
Definition 16. Let ϕ be any formula of SO1Λ(A) of quantifier depth ≤ k, and
let F be a uniform construction for k. Then, we define the generalized predicate
lifting ϕ∗ : Q(−)A → Q◦ T by setting, for a given set X , α ∈ TX and V : A→
Q(X):
α ∈ ϕ∗X(V ) iff (X∗, α∗, V[hα]) 1 ϕ.
The following is obvious:
Proposition 9. If ϕ is a monotone formula then ϕ∗ is a monotone generalized
predicate lifting.
Note that, in order for SO1Λ(A) to admit a uniform translation, it suffices that
there exists for any k a uniform construction F such that, for every formula ϕ
of quantfier depth ≤ k, the generalized lifting ϕ∗ is natural. An equivalent
formulation of this condition is the following.
Proposition 10. Let ϕ be any one-step formula in SO1Λ(A) and let F be a
uniform construction. Then the lifting ϕ∗ is natural if, for any pair of sets
X,Y , any map f : X → Y and any valuation V : A→ Q(Y ), we have
(⋆) (X∗, α∗, V[f◦hα]) 1 ϕ iff (Y∗, β∗, V[hβ ]) 1 ϕ
provided that Tf(α) = β.
A uniform construction F is said to be adequate for k, and with respect
to the liftings Λ, if the equivalence (⋆) holds for all (monotone) formulas in
SO1Λ(A) of quantifier depth ≤ k (for any finite set of variables A). Since we
could of course take the quantifier depth k and the set of liftings as extra inputs
for the uniform construction, we shall simply say that the functor T admits
an adequate uniform construction if there is an adequate uniform construction
for T with respect to every k and every set of monotone liftings. If Λ is an
expressively complete set of liftings, this is equivalent to requiring an adequate
uniform construction with respect to Λ, for every k.
The following theorem, from which we obtain Theorem 2 by taking for Λ
the set of all monotone liftings for T, summarizes the results of this section.
Theorem 6. Let Λ be any expressively complete set of monotone predicate
liftings for the set functor T. If T admits an adequate uniform construction,
then
µMLΛ ≡ MSOΛ/≃.
Example 1. As a first application, the standard Janin-Walukiewicz charac-
terization of the modal µ-calculus can be seen as an instance of the result by
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taking Λ = {,♦} and T = P , recalling that MSO = MSO{♦} ≡ MSO{,♦}. The
adequate uniform construction for P is given as follows: consider a pair (X,α)
with α ∈ P(X). We take this to X∗ = α∗ = α× ω, and we let hα : α × ω → α
be the projection map.
It turns out that several other applications of this result can be obtained in a
particularly simple way. Say that a uniform construction F is strongly adequate
if, for any mapping f : X → Y and any α ∈ TX , β ∈ TY with Tf(α) = β, there
is a bijection g : X∗ → Y∗ such that Tg(α∗) = β∗ and f ◦ hα = hβ ◦ g. Since it
is easy to check that any strongly adequate uniform construction is adequate,
we get:
Corollary 2. If there is a strongly adequate uniform construction for T, then
µMLT ≡ MSOT/≃.
Example 2. As a first example, consider the finitary multiset (“bags”) functor
B, which sends a set X to the set of mappings f : X → ω such that the set
{u ∈ X | f(u) = 0} is cofinite. The action on morphisms is given by letting,
for f ∈ BX and h : X → Y , the multiset Bh(f) : Y → ω be defined by
w 7→
∑
h(v)=w f(v). Given a pair X,α where α : X → ω has finite support, we
define
X∗ =
⋃
{{u} × α(u) | u ∈ X}.
Here, we identify each each n ∈ ω with the set {0, ..., n − 1}. The mapping
α∗ : X∗ → ω is defined by setting α∗(w) = 1 for all w ∈ X∗. The map
hα : X∗ → X is defined by (u, i) 7→ u. It is easy to check that the construction
F is strongly adequate, hence µMLB ≡ MSOB/≃.
As a final application, consider the set of all exponential polynomial func-
tors [5] defined by the “grammar”
T ::= C | Id | T× T |
∐
i∈I
Ti | T(−)
C
where C is any constant functor for some set C, and Id is the identity functor on
Set. These functors cover many important applications: streams, binary trees,
deterministic finite automata and deterministic labelled transition systems are
all examples of coalgebras for exponential polynomial functors, as is the socalled
game functor whose coalgebras provide the semantics for “Coalition Logic” [2].
Proposition 11. Every exponential polynomial functor admits a strongly ade-
quate uniform translation.
Corollary 3. For every exponential polynomial functor T, we have µMLT ≡
MSOT/≃.
The cases where we can find a strongly adequate uniform construction are
the most straightforward applications of Theorem 6 that we know of. The Janin-
Walukiewicz theorem is a less direct application: there is no strongly adequate
uniform construction for the powerset functor, but there is an adequate uniform
construction. In the next section, we shall study an example of a functor where
there is no adequate uniform construction at all.
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6 The monotone neighborhood functor
The final section of our paper concerns the monotone neighborhood functorM.
Our main result concerns a characterization of the fragment of MSOM that is
invariant under global neighborhood bisimulations, to be introduced below. Our
proof applies the method of section 5, but not directly: we will first see that the
functor M itself does not admit an adequate uniform construction.
6.1 No adequate uniform construction for M
We first consider the negative result.
Proposition 12. There is no adequate uniform construction for the monotone
neighborhood functor M.
Proof. To arrive at a contradiction assume that F is adequate. Fix some a ∈ A
and consider the formula ϕ = ∀Z.(a ⊆ Z) expressing that a has empty extension.
Let Y be the set {u, v} and let β ∈ MY be the neighborhood structure
{{u}, {u, v}}. Let V be any valuation with V (a) = {v}. First, we prove that
(Y, β, V ) 1 ϕ
∗: to see this, consider the one-step model (Y ′, β′, V ′) where
β′ = {{u}} and we recall that Y ′ = {u}, and where V ′ is simply the restriction
of V to Y ′. It is easy to show that (Y ′∗ , β
′
∗, V
′
[hβ′ ]
) 1 ϕ, and hence (Y
′, β′, V ′) 1
ϕ∗. Since the generalized predicate lifting ϕ∗ is natural by assumption and
MιY ′,Y (β′) = β, we get (Y, β, V ) 1 ϕ∗ as required.
With this in mind, let X be the set {u∗, v∗, w∗} and let α ∈ MX be the
neighborhood structure
{{u∗, v∗}, {u∗, w∗}, {u∗, v∗, w∗}}
Define the map f : X → Y by setting u∗ 7→ u, v∗ 7→ v and w∗ 7→ u. It can
easily be checked that Mf(α) = β. By naturality of the formula ϕ∗, it follows
that (X,α, V[f ]) 1 ϕ
∗. Hence we must have
(X∗, α∗, V[f◦hα]) 1 ϕ
hence V[f◦hα](a) = ∅. Since v
∗ ∈ V[f ](a), this means that we have v
∗ /∈ hα[X∗].
But since Mhα(α∗) = α, this means hα[X∗] must be a support for α. But it
is easy to show that α cannot have a support S with v∗ /∈ S, so we have now
reached a contradiction showing that F cannot be an adequate construction.
6.2 The functor M⋆
In this section, as a step towards our main characterization result, we shall
consider the language µMLM⋆ , where the functor M
⋆ is a slight variation of
the monotone neighborhood functor M. The functor M⋆ is obtained as the
subfunctor of M×P given by
X 7→ {(α, Y ) ∈ MX × PX | Y supports α}
26
This is indeed a subfunctor of M×P , because given a map h : X → Y , if Z is
a support for α ∈ MX , then h[Z] is a support for Mh(α). Given α ∈ M⋆X ,
we will write α = (Nα, Sα).
Definition 17. For the functor M⋆ we define the unary predicate liftings 
and E by
X(Z) := {α ∈M
⋆X | Z ∈ Nα}
EX(Z) := {α ∈M
⋆X | Z ∩ Sα 6= ∅},
and we let ♦ be the dual of  and let Ed be the dual of E. The set of liftings
{,♦, E,Ed} is denoted as Θ.
The set Θ is an expressively complete set of liftings for M⋆. We shall omit
the proof of this fact here, and merely state it as the following proposition:
Proposition 13. Every monotone natural predicate lifting λ : Q(−)A → Q◦M⋆
is equivalent to a formula in MLΘ(A).
The main technical result of this section states the existence, for all k, of a
uniform construction F that is adequate for k and with respect to the set of
liftings {, E}.
Definition 18. Fix a natural number k. Given a set X , and object α ∈ M⋆X ,
put
X∗ := {(u, i, Z, j) ∈ (X × 2
k × P(Sα)× ω) | u ∈ Z},
and let πX be the projection map from X∗ to X . Define α∗ = (Nα∗ , Sα∗) ∈
M⋆(X∗) by setting Sα∗ = X∗, and set Z ∈ Nα∗ for Z ⊆ Sα∗ iff ⌈Y, j⌉ ⊆ Z for
some Y ∈ α, Y ⊆ Sα and some j < ω, where
⌈Y, j⌉ := {(u, i, Y, j) | u ∈ Y, i < 2k}.
The sets of the form ⌈Z, j⌉ will be called the basic members of Nα∗ .
The main goal of this section is to prove the following:
Proposition 14. The construction given in Definition 18 is an adequate, uni-
form construction for k.
It is easy to check that, for all sets X and α ∈M⋆X , we haveM⋆πX(αF ) =
α.
Our main goal in this section is to prove the following result, from which
Proposition 14 now follows:
Lemma 2. Let X,Y be any sets, α ∈ M⋆X, β ∈ M⋆Y and V : A → Q(Y ).
Suppose that we have a map h : X → Y such that M⋆h(α) = β. Then we have
(X∗, α∗, V[h◦πX ]) ≡
k (Y∗, β∗, V[πY ])
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Here, and throughout this section, we write (X,α, V ) ≡k (Y, β, U) to say that
two one-step models satisfy the same formulas of MSO1{,E}(A) with at most n
nested quantifiers. Let us keep the data X,Y, α, β, V and h fixed throughout
the proof, and assume that M⋆h(α) = β. We will also assume, from now on,
that Nα and Nβ are both non-empty sets: if one of them is empty then both of
them are, and in this case the lemma can be proved essentially using an easier
version of the argument we use below.
Definition 19. Given a finite set of variables A, a propositional A-type τ is a
subset of A. Given a set X and a valuation V : A → Q(X), the propositional
A-type of v ∈ X is defined to be V †(v) = {a ∈ A | v ∈ V (a)}.
Definition 20. Given a basic member ⌈Z, j⌉ either inNα∗ or inNβ∗ , a valuation
V : A → Q(X∗) or V : A → Q(Y∗), and a natural number m, the m-signature
of ⌈Z, j⌉ over variables A and relative to the valuation V is the mapping σ :
P(A)→ {0, ...,m} defined by setting σ(t) to be n < m if ⌈Z, j⌉ contains exactly
n elements of type t under the valuation V , or σ(t) = m if ⌈Z, j⌉ contains at
least m elements of type t.
Definition 21. Let B be any set of variables containing A, and let V1 : B →
Q(X∗) and V2 : B → Q(Y∗). Then for any natural number n we write
(X∗, α∗, V1) ≈
n (Y∗, β∗, V2)
and say that these one-step modelsmatch up to depth n, if: for every n-signature
σ over variables B, either the number of basic elements of signature σ in Nα∗
and Nβ∗ respectively are both finite and the same, or both infinite.
Lemma 3. (X∗, α∗, V[h◦πX ]) ≈
2k (Y∗, β∗, V[πY ]).
Proof. First note that, for any 2k-signature σ, N either contains no basic ele-
ments of signature σ, or infinitely many: if there is some basic element ⌈Z, j⌉
if signature σ, then for any i 6= j, the basic element ⌈Z, i⌉ has the same 2k-
signature as ⌈Z, j⌉ with respect to the valuation Vh◦πX . The same holds for
Nβ∗ with respect to the valuation VπY .
Thus, it suffices to show that Nα∗ contains a basic element of signature σ
w.r.t. V[h◦πX ] iffNβ∗ contains a basic element of signature σ w.r.t V[πY ]. Suppose
that Nβ∗ contains a basic element ⌈Z, j⌉ of signature σ, where Z ∈ Nβ and
Z ⊆ Sβ . Since Nβ =Mh(Nα), we have h−1[Z] ∈ Nα and so h−1[Z]∩Sα ∈ Nα.
Hence we get ⌈
h−1[Z] ∩ Sα, 0
⌉
∈ Nα∗
It is easy to see that any basic element of Nα∗ contains either 0 or at least 2
k
members of a propositional type t w.r.t. V[h◦πX ], and the same is true of any
basic element of Nβ∗ w.r.t. V[πY ]. Hence, to show that
⌈
h−1[Z] ∩ Sα, 0
⌉
has the
same 2k-signature as ⌈Z, j⌉, it suffices to show that these basic elements realize
the same propositional types over B. So suppose
⌈
h−1[Z] ∩ Sα, 0
⌉
contains some
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element v of type t. Then πX(v) ∈ h−1[Z] ∩ Sα, so h ◦ πX(v) ∈ Z. This means
that
(h ◦ πX(v), 0, Z, j) ∈ ⌈Z, j⌉
and this will have the same propositional type as v. Conversely, suppose that
⌈Z, j⌉ contains some element w of type t. Then πY (w) ∈ Z. Since Z ⊆ Sβ , and
Sβ = h[Sα], there exists some w
′ ∈ h−1[Z] ∩ Sα with h(w′) = πY (w). We get
(w′, 0, h−1[Z] ∩ Sα, 0) ∈
⌈
h−1[Z] ∩ Sα, 0
⌉
and this will have the type t.
Now, suppose that Nα∗ contains a basic element ⌈Z, j⌉ of 2
k-signature σ, so
that Z ∈ Nα and Z ⊆ Sα. Then h[Z] ∈ Nβ, and furthermore h[Z] ⊆ Sβ = h[Sα].
Again, it suffices to check that ⌈Z, j⌉ and ⌈h[Z], 0⌉ realize the same propositional
types. Given v ∈ ⌈Z, j⌉, we have h ◦ πX(v) ∈ h[Z] and so
(h ◦ πX(v), 0, h[Z], 0) ∈ ⌈h[Z], 0⌉
and this will have the same propositional type as v. Conversely, if w ∈ ⌈h[Z], 0⌉
then πY (w) ∈ h[Z], so there is w′ ∈ Z with h(w′) = πY (w). We get
(w′, 0, Z, j) ∈ ⌈Z, j⌉
and this has the same propositional type as w.
We are going to show, by induction on a natural number m ≤ k, that if two
one-step models of the form (X∗, α∗, V1) and (Y∗, β∗, V2) match up to depth 2
m,
then they satisfy the same formulas of quantifier depth m. For the basis case of
20 = 1, we need the following result:
Lemma 4. Let B be a set of variables containing A, and let V1 : B → Q(X∗)
and V2 : B → Q(F β(Y )) be valuations such that
(X∗, α∗, V1) ≈
1 (Y∗, β∗, V2)
Then these two one-step models satisfy the same atomic formulas of the one-step
language MSO1{,E}.
Proof. Suppose first that
X∗, α∗, V1) 1 p ⊆ q
where p, q ∈ B. Suppose that V2(p) * V2(q). Then there is some (u, i, Z, j) ∈
Y∗ such that (u, i, Z, j) ∈ V2(p) \ V2(q). We have (u, i, Z, j) ∈ ⌈Z, j⌉, and so
there must be some basic element ⌈Z ′, j′⌉ of Nα∗ of the same 1-signature over
variables B as ⌈Z, j⌉. It follows that there is some element of ⌈Z ′, j′⌉ of the
same propositional type as (u, i, Z, j), and then we cannot have V1(p) ⊆ V1(q).
The converse direction is proved in the same manner.
Now, suppose that
(X∗, α∗, V1) 1 p
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Then V1(p) ∈ Nα∗ , so there is some basic element ⌈Z, j⌉ ∈ Nα∗ with ⌈Z, j⌉ ⊆
V1(p). There must be some basic ⌈Z ′, j′⌉ ∈ Nβ∗ of the same 1-signature over
B as ⌈Z, j⌉, and clearly it follows that ⌈Z ′, j′⌉ ⊆ V2(p) and so V2(p) ∈ Nβ∗ as
required. The converse direction is proved in the same way.
Finally, suppose that
(X∗, α∗, V1) 1 Ep
Then there is some (u, i, Z, j) ∈ Sα∗ with (u, i, Z, j) ∈ V1(p). We have (u, i, Z, j) ∈
⌈Z, j⌉, and there must be some basic element ⌈Z ′, j′⌉ of Nβ∗ with the same 1-
signature as ⌈Z, j⌉. Hence, ⌈Z ′, j′⌉ contains some element (u′, i′, Z ′, j′) of the
same propositional type as (u, i, Z, j), and it follows that
(Y∗, β∗, V2) 1 Ep
as required. The converse direction is proved in the same way.
To clinch the proof of Proposition 14, we now only need the following lemma:
Lemma 5. Let B be a finite set of variables containing A, let 0 < m ≤ k and
let V1 : B → Q(X∗) and V2 : B → Q(Y∗) be valuations such that
(X∗, α∗, V1) ≈
2m (Y∗, β∗, V2)
Let q be any fresh variable. Then for any valuation V ′1 extending V1 with some
value for q, there exists a valuation V ′2 extending V2, such that
(X∗, α∗, V
′
1) ≈
2(m−1) (Y∗, β∗, V
′
2)
and vice versa.
Proof. We only prove one direction since the other direction can be proved by a
symmetric argument. Let V ′1 be given. By the hypothesis, for any 2
m-signature
σ over the variables B, either the number of basic elements of signature σ in
Nα∗ and Nβ∗ relative to V1 and V2 are both finite and the same, or both infinite.
Let σ1, ..., σk be a list of all the distinct 2
m-signatures over B such that the set
of basic elements of Nα∗ and Nβ∗ of signature σi, with 1 ≤ i ≤ k, is non-empty
but finite, and let σk+1, ..., σl be a list of all the 2
m-signatures such that, for
k + 1 ≤ i ≤ l, there are infinitely many basic elements of Nα∗ and of Nβ∗ of
signature σi. Then, for each i ∈ {1, ..., l}, let α∗[σi] denote the set of basic
elements in Nα∗ of signature σi, and similarly let β∗[σi] denote the set of basic
elements of Nβ∗ of signature σi. Then α∗[σ1], ..., α∗[σl] is a partition of the set
of basic elements of Nα∗ into non-empty cells, and similarly β∗[σ1], ..., β∗[σl] is
a partition of the set of basic elements of Nβ∗ .
Given the extended valuation V ′1 in X∗ defined on variables B ∪ {q}, we
similarly let τ1, ..., τk∗ be a list of all the 2
m−1-signatures over B ∪ {q} such
that, for 1 ≤ i ≤ k∗, the set of basic elements of Nα∗ of 2
m−1-signature τi is
non-empty but finite. We let τk∗+1, ..., τl∗ be a list of all the 2
m−1-signatures
over B∪{q} such that, for each i with k∗+1 ≤ i ≤ l∗, the set of basic elements of
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Nα∗ of 2
m−1-signature τi is infinite. Let α∗[τi] denote the set of basic elements
of Nα∗ of 2
m−1-signature τi, so that the collection α∗[τ1], ..., α∗[τl∗ ] constitutes a
second partition of the set of basic elements ofNα∗. It will be useful to introduce
the abbreviation D1 for the finite set α∗[σ1]∪ ... ∪α∗[σk], and the abbreviation
D2 for the finite set α∗[τ1] ∪ ... ∪ α∗[τk∗ ].
For each i with 1 ≤ i ≤ k, there is a bijection between the set α∗[σi] and
β∗[σi], and we can paste all these bijections together into a bijective map
f : α∗[σ1] ∪ ... ∪ α∗[σk]→ β∗[σ1] ∪ ... ∪ β∗[σk]
Since every basic element of Nα∗ not in D1 belongs to a 2
m-signature of which
there are infinitely many basic elements in β∗, and since D1 ∪D2 is finite, it is
easy to see that we can extend the map f to a map g which is an injection from
the set D1 ∪D2 into the set of basic elements of Nβ∗ , such that for each basic
element ⌈Z, j⌉ in D1 ∪ D2, ⌈Z, j⌉ and g(⌈Z, j⌉) have the same 2
m-signature
over B, and such that g ↾ D1 = f . Each basic element of Nβ∗ not in the
image of g must then be of one of the 2m-signatures σk+1, ..., σl, and so we can
partition the set of basic elements of Nβ∗ outside the image of g into the cells
β∗[σk+1] \ g[D2], ..., β∗[σl] \ g[D2]. For each i with k+1 ≤ i ≤ l, let γi1, ..., γ
i
r list
all infinite sets of the form α∗[σi]∩ α∗[τj ] for k∗ + 1 ≤ j ≤ l∗. The list γi1, ..., γ
i
r
must be non-empty, and so since the set β∗[σi] \ g[D2] is also infinite, we may
partition it into r many infinite cells and list these as δi1, ..., δ
i
r. Now, for each
basic element ⌈Z, j⌉ of β∗, we define a map W⌈Z,j⌉ from B ∪ {q} to P(⌈Z, j⌉)
by a case distinction as follows:
Case 1: ⌈Z, j⌉ = g(⌈Z ′, j′⌉) for some ⌈Z ′, j′⌉ ∈ D1 ∪ D2. Then ⌈Z, j⌉
and ⌈Z ′, j′⌉ have the same 2m-signature over B. Using this fact we define the
valuation W⌈Z,j⌉ so that, for each p ∈ B, we have W⌈Z,j⌉(p) = V2(p) ∩ ⌈Z, j⌉,
and so that ⌈Z ′, j′⌉ and ⌈Z, j⌉ have the same 2m−1-signature over B ∪ {q} with
respect to the valuations V ′1 and W⌈Z,j⌉.
We show how to assign the value of the variable q: for each propositional
type t over B∪{q}, there are three different possible cases to consider. If ⌈Z ′, j′⌉
has l < 2m−1 elements of type t∪{q} over B∪{q}, then pick l many elements of
⌈Z, j⌉ of type t and mark them by q. This is possible since l < 2m−1 ≤ 2m and
⌈Z ′, j′⌉ and ⌈Z, j⌉ have the same 2m-signature. If there are l < 2m−1 elements
of ⌈Z ′, j′⌉ of type t over B ∪ {q}, then pick l elements of ⌈Z, j⌉ of type t over
B, and mark all the other elements of ⌈Z, j⌉ of type t by q. Finally, if there
are at least 2m−1 elements of ⌈Z ′, j′⌉ of type t ∪ {q} over B ∪ {q} and at least
2m−1 elements of ⌈Z ′, j′⌉ of type t over B ∪ {q}, then all in all there must be
at least 2m elements of ⌈Z ′, j′⌉ of type t over B, and so there must be at least
2m elements of ⌈Z, j⌉ of type t over B. Pick 2m−1 of these and mark them by
q. Finally, let W⌈Z,j⌉(q) be the set of elements of ⌈Z, j⌉ marked by q.
Case 2: ⌈Z, j⌉ is not in the image of g. Then there must be some i ∈
{k∗ + 1, ..., l∗} such that ⌈Z, j⌉ ∈ β∗[σk+1] \ g[D2], and this set is partitioned
into δi1, ..., δ
i
r. Let ⌈Z, j⌉ ∈ δ
i
j , and pick some arbitary element ⌈Z
′, j′⌉ of the
set γij . Then ⌈Z
′, j′⌉ and ⌈Z, j⌉ have the same 2m-signature over B and we can
proceed as in Case 1.
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We define the valuation V ′2 by setting V
′
2(q) to be the union of the sets
W⌈Z,j⌉(q) for ⌈Z, j⌉ a basic element in Nβ∗ . It is now fairly straightforward to
check that
(X∗, α∗, V
′
1) ≈
2(m−1) (Y∗, β∗, V
′
2)
as required.
First, suppose there are infinitely many basic elements of Nα∗ of some 2
m−1
signature τj , meaning that k
∗ ≤ j ≤ l∗. Then since the set α∗[τj ] is infinite, D1
is finite and α∗[τj ] is equal to
(D1 ∩ α∗[τj ]) ∪ (α∗[σk+1] ∩ α∗[τj ]) ∪ ... ∪ (α∗[σl] ∩ α∗[τj ])
there must be some i ∈ {k+ 1, ..., l} such that the set α∗[σi] ∩ α∗[τj ] is infinite.
This means that α∗[σi] ∩ α∗[τj ] appears in the list γi1, ..., γ
i
r, and so we see that
all elements of some member of the list δi1, ..., δ
i
r will have the 2
m−1-signature
τj . Since each member of this list is infinite, we see that there must be infinitely
many basic elements of Nβ∗ of signature τj .
Conversely, suppose there are infinitely many basic elements of Nβ∗ of 2
m−1-
signature τj over B ∪ {q}. Then since the image of g is finite, some of these
elements must be outside the image of g, which means that for some i ∈ {k +
1, ..., l}, some member of the list δi1, ..., δ
i
r will consist of elements of signature
τj . This means that some member of the list γ
i
1, ..., γ
i
r will consist of elements
of signature τj , and since each member of this list is infinite we see that Nα∗
has infinitely many basic elements of 2m−1-signature τj over B ∪ {q}.
Finally, suppose that there are finitely many basic elements of Nα∗ and
Nβ∗ of 2
m−1-signature τj . We check that the mapping g restricts to a bijection
between the basic elements of Nα∗ and Nβ∗ of this signature. First, g is injective
and maps basic elements of Nα∗ of signature τj to basic elements of Nβ∗ of
signature τj . It only remains to show that (the restriction of) g is surjective, i.e.
each basic element ⌈Z, r⌉ of signature τj is equal to g(⌈Z ′, r′⌉) for some ⌈Z ′, r′⌉.
But suppose ⌈Z, r⌉ is not in the image of g; then it is in one of the members of
the list δi1, ..., δ
i
r for some i, and since each of these members is an infinite set
of basic elements of the same signature, we see that there are infinitely many
basic elements of Nβ∗ of signature τj , contrary to our assumption. Hence, the
proof is done.
Lemma 2 can now be deduced by combining the last three lemmas, by a
straightforward argument using Ehrenfeucht-Fra¨ısse´ games for the one-step lan-
guage.
6.3 Global neighborhood bisimulations
Since the set of liftings {,♦} can be shown to be expressively complete forM,
and since ♦ is just the dual of , the monadic second order language MSOM is
equivalent to the logic MMSO which has its syntax given by
ϕ ::= sr(p) | p ⊆ q | (p, q) | ∃p.ϕ | ¬ϕ | ϕ ∨ ϕ.
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The semantics of an atomic formula (p, q) in a neighborhood model S is given,
concretely, by the clause: (S, σ, V, u)  (p, q) if, for all v ∈ V (p), there is
Z ∈ σ(v) such that Z ⊆ V (q).
At the present time, we do not know how to characterize the fragment of the
language MMSO that is invariant for arbitrary neighborhood bisimulations. How-
ever, the situation changes if we consider global bisimulations between neigh-
borhood models.
Definition 22. A global neighborhood bisimulation between M-models S1 and
S2 is a neighborhood bisimulation R that satisfies the conditions:
Forth For every u ∈ S1 there is some v ∈ S2 with uRv
Back For every v ∈ S2 there is some u ∈ S1 with uRv
We now ask: what is the fragment of MMSO that is invariant for global neigh-
borhood bisimulations? Since global bisimulations are the natural equivalence
relation for modal logic with the global modalities, the most reasonable candidate
would be: the monotone modal µ-calculus extended with the global modalities.
To be precise, let the monotone modal µ-calculus with global modalities, denoted
µMMLg, be the language defined by the grammar:
ϕ ::= p | ¬p | ⊥ | ⊤ | ϕ | ♦ϕ | [∀]ϕ | [∃]ϕ
| ϕ ∨ ϕ | ϕ ∧ ϕ | µp.ϕ | νp.ϕ
where the formula ϕ in µp.ϕ and νp.ϕ must be positive in the variable p. The
new operators [∀] and [∃] are the global universal and existential modalities,
with their standard semantics: (S, u)  [∀]ϕ if (S, v)  ϕ for all v ∈ S, and
(S, u)  [∃]ϕ if (S, v)  ϕ for some v ∈ S.
Given an M⋆-model S, let SM be the underlying M-model. Conversely,
given an M-model S = (S, σ, V ), define the M⋆-model SG = (S, σG, V ) by
setting σG(s) = (σ(s), S). The main result of this section is the following.
Theorem 7. A formula in MMSO is invariant for global neighborhood bisimula-
tions if, and only if, it is equivalent to a formula of the logic µMMLg.
Proof. Clearly µMMLg translates into MMSO and is invariant for global bisimula-
tions.
Conversely, suppose ϕ ∈ MMSO is invariant for global neighborhood bisimu-
lations. First observe that ϕ can be regarded as a formula in MSOM⋆ as well.
More precisely, there is a formula ϕ∗ ∈ MSOM⋆ such that
(T, t)  ϕ∗ iff (TM, t)  ϕ (5)
for any M⋆-model (T, t). By Corollary 1 there is a second-order {, E}-
automaton Aϕ such that
Aϕ ≡ ϕ
∗ (on all M⋆-tree models). (6)
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Now we use the existence of an adequate, uniform construction for M⋆
(Proposition 14). Let Atϕ be the corresponding modal Λ-automaton given by
Proposition 8, where Λ is the collection of all monotone, natural predicate
liftings for M⋆. By Proposition 13 we may in fact assume that Atϕ is a Θ-
automaton, where Θ = {,♦, E,Ed}. Let ψ = ψAtϕ be the corresponding
formula in µMLΘ. We claim that, for any pointed neighborhood model (S, s) we
have
S, s  ϕ iff SG, s  ψ. (7)
To prove this, consider the M⋆-tree model (T, R, r) given by Proposition 8,
applied to the pointed M⋆-model (SG, s). Then there is a surjective M⋆-
coalgebra morphism f : (T, r)→ (SG, s), and so in particular, f is the graph of a
global neighborhood bisimulation between TM and S relating r to s. Gathering
some facts we obtain the following chain of equivalences:
S, s  ϕ iff TM, r  ϕ (assumption on ϕ)
iff T, r  ϕ∗ (5)
iff T, R, r  Aϕ (6)
iff SG, s  Atϕ (Proposition 8)
iff SG, s  ψ (assumption on ψ)
which proves (7) indeed.
Finally, let ψ∀ ∈ µMMLg be the formula we obtain from ψ by replacing every
occurrence of E with [∃] and every occurrence of Ed with [∀]. It is a routine
check to verify that
SG, s  ψ iff S, s  ψ∀. (8)
But then the equivalence of ϕ ∈ MMSO and ψ∀ ∈ µMMLg is immediate from (7)
and (8).
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